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Whose Absentee Votes Are Counted? 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Absentee voting is becoming more prevalent throughout the United States.  While there has been 
some research focused on who votes by absentee ballot, little research has considered another 
important question about absentee voting:  Which absentee ballots are counted, and which are 
not?  Research following the 2000 presidential election has studied the problem of uncounted 
ballots for precinct voters, but not for absentee voters.  To study which absentee ballots are 
counted we use data from Los Angeles County – the nation’s largest and most diverse voting 
jurisdiction – for the November 2002 general election.  We develop three hypotheses regarding 
the likelihood that various types of ballots will be counted, which we test with our unique 
absentee voting dataset.  We find that uniform service personnel, overseas civilians, and 
language minority voters have a much higher likelihood that their ballots will not be counted 
compared with the general absentee voting population.  We conclude our paper with a discussion 
of the implications of our research for the current debates about absentee voting. 
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Introduction 
 
 In recent years there has been a dramatic liberalization of absentee voting laws 
throughout the United States.  For example, in California, before 1978 only registered voters 
who were ill, disabled, or for other documented reasons could not get to a polling place on 
election day could vote absentee; after 1978, any registered California voter could vote absentee 
without a documented cause.  In the 1978 California general election, 314,258 absentee votes 
were cast (4.41% of all votes cast); but by the 2002 general election, 2,096,094 absentee votes 
were cast (27.09% of all votes cast).1  Another example is Oregon, widely considered a leader in 
absentee voting. In 1998, 58% of the votes cast in their general election were absentee ballots, 
but following the passage of Ballot Measure 60 in 1998, all of Oregon’s statewide elections are 
now conducted by mail.   The United States Census Bureau estimated that at least 14% of votes 
cast in the 2000 presidential election were absentee or early votes.2 
 But absentee voting, especially the liberalization of voting-by-mail, is not without critics.  
Some have criticized “by demand” absentee voting (in contrast to “by need” absentee voting) 
because of fears about voter coercion, the lack of privacy, and the potential for fraud 
(Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001).  Others have criticized absentee voting as a 
mechanism that undermines civic values and might lead voters to cast less informed ballots, as 
the early voters do not have access to late-breaking campaign information (Ornstein 2001).   
There is also a healthy academic debate about whether or not the presence of liberalized absentee 
voting procedures, like in Oregon, help fuel a long-term increase in voter turnout (Berinsky et al. 
2001; Southwell and Burchett 2000a). 
A large descriptive literature exists on how absentee voting laws have changed over time 
and the potential impact of these changes on election outcomes (APSA 1952; Keyssar 2000; 
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Martin 1945; Ray 1926, 1919, 1918a, 1918b, 1914; Steinbicker 1938; Winther 1944).  In recent 
years, research has focused on the factors that lead to increases in absentee voting (e.g., Dubin 
and Kalsow 1996a, 1996b; Oliver 1996; Patterson and Caldeira 1985), the impact of absentee 
voting and other electoral procedures on overall voter participation (e.g., Kim et al. 1975; Oliver 
1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and the impact of having 
the entire population of a jurisdiction vote absentee – as occurs in Oregon – on overall voter 
turnout (Berinsky et al. 2001; Karp and Banducci 2000; Southwell and Burchett 2000a, 2000b, 
1997).  There are also normative arguments regarding whether absentee voting has other broader 
impacts on civic values and the political process (e.g., Gans 2000; Ornstein 2001). 
 The research literature tends to focus on a single aspect of the absentee voting process – 
the actual casting of ballots using the typical absentee voting method, also known as by-mail 
voting or postal voting.  However, as the 2000 general election showed, the decision by the voter 
to cast an absentee ballot is only one aspect of the voting process.  After the ballot is cast, there is 
a second decision that is made primarily by election officials, who have to determine whether the 
ballot cast should be counted.  For a variety of reasons, many absentee ballots (as well as ballots 
cast in-person at poll sites on Election Day) are not included in the vote tabulation process.  
Absentee ballots can be excluded from final tabulation for a variety of reasons: the ballot is 
returned to the local election official after the deadline for accepting such ballots, the information 
on the outside of the absentee ballot (which validates its authenticity), is not completed entirely 
or appears incorrect, the voter’s eligibility to cast such a ballot is challenged, or the ballot is 
spoiled in some way.3    This second part of the absentee voting process --- the decision whether 
or not particular absentee ballots are included in final election tabulation --- has been ignored in 
the research literature.  As increasing numbers of ballots are being cast using the absentee 
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process, it is important to understand how many absentee ballots are not being counted and who 
is casting these uncounted ballots. 
 Thus, our research focuses on this unanswered question about absentee voting.  Which 
absentee ballots are counted, and which are not?  To answer this question we use data from Los 
Angeles County – the nation’s largest and most diverse voting jurisdiction – for the November 
2002 general election to examine both halves of the absentee voting equation.  In the next section 
we discuss the specifics of our absentee voting dataset, and the hypotheses we test.  Then we turn 
to our empirical results, and we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our research 
for the current debates about absentee voting. 
Studying Absentee Voting in Los Angeles County 
 
 In the empirical analysis we present below we use the “absentee voter file” (AVF) from 
Los Angeles County’s November 2002 general election.  This file has a record for every eligible 
absentee voter:  all permanent absentee voters, all those in vote-by-mail districts, all of the 
overseas civilians and military personnel voters, and all others who did not cast a ballot in a 
traditional precinct polling place.  The AVF records the process used by each absentee voter to 
request a ballot; it also records two aspects regarding the resolution of the ballot request:  (1) 
whether the absentee ballot was returned or not, and (2) if it was returned whether it was 
included in the vote tabulation.  The AVF also records basic voter registration and absentee 
voting information, like party registration, birth-date, and ballot language.  We discuss the details 
of the specific AVF records that are part of our study below. 
Los Angeles County, California is the largest and most complex election jurisdiction in 
the United States.  In the November 2002 general election, there were almost 4 million registered 
 5
voters in Los Angeles County, and almost 5000 voting precincts.  There were almost 1.8 million 
ballots cast in the November 2002 election, with almost 360,000 of them coming from absentee 
voters.  In Los Angeles County, election officials are required to provide all elections materials 
in six languages in addition to English:  Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Tagalog and 
Vietnamese.  This election cost more than $20 million dollars in administrative costs alone. 
 The sheer size and complexity of election administration in Los Angeles County make it 
an important case for study.  With the large number of absentee voting requests and ballots cast, 
we have sufficient data to study statistically what in other election jurisdictions might be slivers 
of the voting population; for an important example, overseas civilian and military personnel.  
Thus, the sheer size of Los Angeles County’s absentee voting population provides us with more 
statistical power than we could gain by studying other election jurisdictions.  Second, the 
political and social diversity of Los Angeles County provides us the opportunity to study 
additional questions about absentee voters, especially in our case the relative ease with which 
non-English speaking citizens can use the absentee voting process. 
 On the other hand, studying only Los Angeles County has limitations.  The most 
important limitation of our analysis is our focus on one large and urban California county.  Thus, 
given the unique characteristics of Los Angeles County and the specific nature of California’s 
election laws (especially those governing absentee voting), we must be cautious about 
extrapolating from our results to other election jurisdictions. 
Previous Research and Our Hypotheses 
 
One aspect of the absentee voting process that has not been studied in the research 
literature are the many ways in which citizens (here Californian citizens) can vote outside the 
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polling place.4  First, there is the type of absentee voting that is commonly associated with the 
practice:  a registered voter completes an absentee ballot form (provided in their sample ballot, or 
by third parties like candidates or political organizations) and either sends it to their county 
election official or drops it off at an election office; these voters receive their ballot later by mail, 
and either return it in the mail, drop it off in person at an election office or at a polling place on 
election day, or have an authorized third party return it for them.   
Second, there are permanent absentee voters.  After registered voters request this status, 
they automatically receive absentee ballots in the mail; as long as they return their ballot in all 
statewide elections they retain their permanent absentee voter status.  Also, voters who obtain a 
court order showing necessary cause for their registration information to be kept confidential are 
categorized as a type of permanent absentee voter until the election official is informed that it is 
no longer necessary to keep the voter’s identification confidential.5  Last, under certain 
conditions voters can be required to vote by mail, at the discretion of the local election official:  
if the voter’s election precinct has fewer that 250 registered voters on the 88th day before an 
election, the precinct can be declared a “mail ballot precinct” and all voters in the precinct are 
automatically sent absentee ballots. 
Third, overseas citizens and military personnel, formally covered by the “Uniformed 
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act” (recently updated by the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2002 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002), have an expedited and 
simplified registration and absentee ballot request process.  These citizens can use the “Federal 
Postcard Application,” which simultaneously serves as a voter registration and absentee ballot 
request, thus simplifying the process for this group.  Also, citizens in this same group can request 
“special absentee voter” status; which, because of their location or duties makes it impossible for 
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them to vote absentee during the required period.  “Special absentee voters” receive their ballot 
approximately 60 days before the election; all other requests for absentee ballots made more than 
29 days before the election are not processed until the 29th day before the election.   
A final category of absentee voters in California are those who because of illness, 
disability, or physical handicap are unable to vote at a precinct polling place and who have 
missed the application deadline for requesting an absentee ballot.6  These citizens can request an 
absentee ballot in writing which can be provided to an authorized representative of the citizen 
who presents the written application to an election official.  The voter, or their authorized 
representative, can return the absentee ballot to an election official or to any polling place in the 
election jurisdiction.   
These various categories of absentee voting – which exist alongside poll site voting in all 
states but Oregon – shows how voters make a series of choices about whether they want to vote 
and how they want to vote.  Research on absentee voting has traditionally focused on the 
behavioral decision by registered voters whether to cast their ballot in the polling place or by 
some absentee method, and has focused on the relative differences between absentee voters, 
precinct voters, and non-voters, usually employing survey data.  There has been little attention 
focused on the different types of absentee voters or on the important political question of whose 
absentee ballots are returned and then counted. 
The latter is a critical question, highlighted by studies of voting in the wake of the 2000 
presidential election (e.g., Alvarez and Sinclair 2004; Caltech/MIT 2001; Tomz and Van 
Houweling 2003).  Despite conventional wisdom, casting an absentee ballot is not the same as 
casting a vote at the polls as the voter does not place their ballot in a box or in the memory of an 
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electronic voting machine.  Instead, they mail their ballot or deliver it to an election official, and 
are rarely certain how the ballot is adjudicated.   
Absentee ballots can be challenged and not counted in the certified results for a variety of 
reasons.  The most likely reason why a ballot  is rejected is that it is received after the close of 
the polls.  For example, in California absentee ballots have to be received by the election official 
by the close of the polls on Election Day.  However, even if a ballot is received in time, it can be 
challenged for other reasons.  When the election official receives a ballot, all of the information 
on the outside of the ballot that authenticates the ballot is examined.  A voter is required to sign 
the ballot envelope and provide other information, such as their address.  If the signature does 
not match or is missing, or the other information does not match what is on file, the ballot is also 
rejected.7  
Voting for certain absentee populations is also more difficult.  Recent studies by the US 
General Accounting Office (2001) show that casting a meaningful absentee vote can be very 
difficult for individuals who are UOCAVA voters.  One key problem is ballot transit time; a 
2001 GAO study found that transit times for first class mail can range from as little as five days 
to as much as a month (GAO 2001).  Additionally, all voters – including UOCAVA voters – 
make errors in completing the forms required for an absentee ballot request.  As the GAO noted, 
[M]ilitary and overseas voters do not always complete absentee voting 
requirements or use federal forms correctly. The basic steps that absentee voters 
must take to register and request an absentee ballot are similar for all states. 
Nevertheless, absentee voting schedules and requirements vary from state to state. 
In addition, counties vary in how they interpret and implement state 
requirements... varying state and county requirements resulted in confusion 
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among voters about residency requirements and about the deadlines for 
registering to vote, requesting a ballot, and returning the voted ballot.  County 
officials said that problems in processing absentee voting applications arise 
primarily because voters do not fill in the forms correctly or do not begin the 
voting process early enough to complete the multiple steps they must take (GAO 
2001, pages 40-41). 
 In a recent significant study, similar to ours, by Imai and King (2002) examined late 
overseas absentee ballots received in the 2000 Florida election after November 7, 2000, which 
county canvassing boards deliberated over between November 17 and November 26.8  Imai and 
King (2002) examined 3739 overseas ballots, of which 2490 where accepted and counted by 
canvassing boards; thus, 33% of the overseas ballots received in Florida after November 7, 2000 
were invalidated for various. 
 Importantly, Imai and King (2002) studied the 2490 overseas absentee ballots received 
after November 7, 2000, which were accepted by canvassing boards and included in their county 
tabulations.  Based on their understanding of the Florida regulations for what constitutes an 
acceptable overseas absentee ballot, they found that 680 (27%) of the accepted overseas absentee 
ballots were flawed.  Had these 680 ballots not been accepted, then 52% of the late overseas 
absentee ballots would have been rejected in the 2000 Florida election. 
 The most common flaw found in these ballots was that many had no visible proof of 
having been mailed by Election Day.  Under Florida law, overseas absentee ballots in the 2000 
election needed an indication (like a postmark or dated signature) to demonstrate it was mailed 
before November 7, 2000; 756 ballots did not, and 344 of the counted ballots had this problem.  
The second type of flaw involved ballots that did not have a witness signature or the witness’s 
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complete address; 527 ballots had this flaw, and 96 of the counted ballots were flawed in this 
way. 
 The third most significant flaw in the late overseas absentee ballots was that 327 were 
received after November 7, 2000 with a domestic postmark, and 183 of these ballots were 
counted; Florida law states that absentee ballots that are mailed from within the United States or 
territories must be received before November 7, 2000.  Next, in Florida overseas absentee voters 
can submit two ballots, and only the second ballots is to be counted; the researchers found 19 
instances where both ballots were counted.  Last, 69 ballots were received after November 17, 
2000 which was the last day overseas absentee ballots could be received (10 days after the 
election), and 5 of these ballots were counted.  From Imai and King’s examination of the late 
overseas absentee ballots from Florida, we see that these ballots contained an extremely high 
number of errors.  Many voters cast ballots that probably should have been rejected. 
The Imai and King (2002) study is significant substantively, as it documents major 
problems with the absentee voting process for this one category of absentee voters.  Overseas 
citizens and military personnel can, just because of the vagaries of both overseas and domestic 
mail systems, think they voted when in fact their ballot was not counted.  Their study is 
methodologically important as well, because they analyze the actual absentee ballots themselves, 
and thus know which ballots were counted and which were not.  Unfortunately, beyond the Imai 
and King study, little is known about the resolution of absentee ballots more generally, and about 
overseas citizen and military absentee ballots specifically.  The only attempt at a national study 
was conducted in 2001 by the GAO, and they prefaced their study by noting that “many counties 
could not provide data on how many absentee ballots they had received from military and 
overseas voters covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and 
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how many of these ballots they had disqualified” (GAO 2001, page 52).  Based on partial data, 
the GAO estimated that 8.1% of military and overseas absentee ballots were disqualified in 2000 
in small counties, relative to a disqualification rate of 1.8% for other absentee voters.9 
 There are other voting populations that are vulnerable to problems with the absentee 
voting process.  In Los Angeles County, there are six language minorities – Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, Spanish, Tagalog, and Vietnamese – and under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its 
amendments, the County is required to serve these voters in their native language.  However, 
many of these voters also are not used to participating in democratic elections and, even with the 
outreach efforts of the County and groups assisting language minority voting populations, many 
find the absentee voting process difficult to navigate.  In fact, one of the most common reasons 
why voters contact the Korean American Coalition’s election hotline is to learn more about the 
election and the general aspects of the voting process (Hall 2002; Hall forthcoming). 
 There is research that has studied the political participation by non-foreign born and by 
non-English proficient citizens.  In particular, language proficiency has been shown to be a 
critical predictor of participation in recent research (e.g., Citrin and Highton 2002, Tam Cho 
1999).1  A lack of English proficiency can clearly make the process of voting --- and in particular 
absentee voting --- more costly and complicated for a citizen (Downs 1957, Tam Cho 1999).  
This is especially true in the absentee voting process, since  biliterate skill development tends to 
develop slower than bilingual skill development among language minorities.  Asian language 
minorities—of which there are five in Los Angeles County—have an especially difficult time 
developing biliterate skills because almost all have non-Roman alphabetic writing systems (Loo 
1985).  This leads us to expect that registered voters who lack English proficiency will also have 
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difficulty navigating the absentee voting process, and that they will be less likely to return their 
absentee ballots and to have their ballots counted. 
Thus, based on the previous studies on absentee voting, we have three hypotheses that we 
test in this paper.  First, we expect that overseas voters will be less likely to return their absentee 
ballots, but will be more likely to have their ballots challenged upon return.  This hypothesis is 
based on the results found in the GAO report (2001) and Imai and King (2002).  Second, we also 
expect to find that voters who use a non-English ballot will be less likely to return their ballots 
and will be more likely to have their ballot challenged upon return.  We base this hypothesis on 
the special problems this class of voters faces regarding the basic accessibility of the electoral 
process, and on past research (Tam Cho 1999) that demonstrates that language proficiency is an 
important predictor of political participation.  Last, we expect to find that absentee voters who 
have applied for an absentee ballot specifically in this election, relative to those who are 
permanent absentee voters or are in vote-by-mail precincts, will be more likely to return their 
absentee ballots.  This hypothesis is based on the assumption that registered voters who have 
taken the active step of requesting a ballot for the current election are likely to be more interested 
in the election and hence more motivated to cast their ballot.  We test these hypotheses below 
using both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques. 
Empirical Results 
 
We begin our analyses of our hypotheses with a presentation of descriptive statistics that 
summarize the absentee voter file from the 2002 November elections in Los Angeles County.  
We then turn to some bivariate presentations of the data that provide preliminary tests of our 
hypotheses.  We finally present the results from two binary logit analyses where we subject our 
hypotheses to a controlled test. 
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In Table 1 we provide descriptive statistics regarding the relative frequencies of each type 
of absentee voter.  “Sample Ballot” absentee voters are ones who applied for their absentee ballot 
using the form provided in their sample ballot materials that were mailed to their registration 
address.  These absentee voters make up the largest group, at just over 40% of the absentee voter 
file.  “Permanent” absentee voters are those who have requested that absentee voting status.  In 
the 2002 general elections, these voters made up almost 33% of those in the absentee voting file.  
Next were those in the “Apply by Mail” category; these registered voters requested an absentee 
ballot using some application (most likely provided by a political campaign, party, or interest 
group), and comprise 22.46% of those in the absentee voter file. 
Table 1 Goes Here 
These three types of absentee voters make up almost 96% of the absentee voter file in this 
election in Los Angeles County.  The remaining 4% are almost entirely those who have been 
classified as “Vote by Mail” voters, who have requested an absentee ballot in person (“Walk-in” 
absentee voters, who are 0.29% of the absentee voter requests), who are “Overseas” (0.28%), or 
who requested an absentee ballot due to their inability to get to a polling place because of 
hospitalization or other infirmity (the “Hospital” classification, 0.14% of absentee voters). 
The absentee voter file also contained other valuable information about each individual 
registered voter:  whether they asked for their absentee ballot in English or another available 
language; the party they registered with (here coded as Democratic, Republican, Third Party, or 
Decline-To-State [DTS]); and their birth-date, which we coded into five age categories.   
Table 2 Goes Here 
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In Table 2 we provide the basic descriptive statistics for the registered voters in the 
absentee voter file.  The overwhelming tendency of absentee voters was to request an English 
ballot – only 3.33% of those in the absentee voter file requested a non-English ballot.  The 
partisan registration of voters in this election who requested an absentee ballot was mainly 
Democratic (about 54%); Republicans were a third of the file (34%).  Only 2.4% of the absentee 
voters were third party registrants, while over 10% recorded no party affiliation when they 
registered.  The age distribution of the absentee voters in Table 2 documents a clear skew 
towards the older age categories.  Only 19% of the youngest voters (18 to 25) requested absentee 
ballots, and a scant 8% of the 26 to 35 year old voters did as well.  But 25% of those 51 to 65 
requested absentee ballots, as did an identical percentage of those over the age of 65. 
We continue looking at the basic attributes of absentee voters by considering the way in 
which they requested an absentee ballot.  In Table 3, we present two panels of information:  the 
top panel provides ballot request breakdowns for language use and partisanship, and the bottom 
panel provides the same breakdowns for the age distributions.  Of the 15,788 absentee voters 
who requested a non-English ballot, almost 41% did so using the form provided in their sample 
ballot.  Additionally, 35% of the non-English registered voters in the absentee voter file are 
permanent absentee voters, while another 21% applied by mail.   
Table 3 Goes Here 
In terms of partisanship, there were 255,417 voters in the absentee voter file with a 
Democratic party affiliation.  Democratic absentee voters were roughly one-third permanent 
absentee voters, and another third used their sample ballot application.  Almost 29% of 
Democratic absentee voters applied by mail.  Republican absentee voters were much more likely 
to use the sample ballot application (48%), and almost one-third of Republican absentee voters 
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were permanently registered as absentee.  Many fewer Republicans than Democrats applied by 
mail.  Decline-To-State and third party absentee voters demonstrate a profile much like 
Republicans:  47% used the sample ballot application, one-third were permanent absentee voters, 
and about 13% applied by mail.  However, both decline-to-state and third party absentee voters 
were about twice as likely to be in vote-by-mail precincts or to be overseas absentee voters. 
The bottom panel of Table 3 gives the same ballot request breakdowns by age.  Of 
younger voters (19-25 years of age), almost 40% used the sample ballot to get their absentee 
ballot, 21% applied by mail, and 36% were permanent absentee voters.  As we move to examine 
the next three age groups, we see that the use of the sample ballot application increases for 26-65 
year olds, as does the use of general absentee ballot request by mail.  The 26 to 65 year old 
voters are less likely to be permanent absentee voters.  Absentee voters over 65 are very likely to 
be permanent absentee voters (46%) and are less likely to have used the sample ballot or other 
by-mail means to get their absentee ballot.   
Next, we turn to the question of absentee ballot resolution.  For every individual in the 
November 2002 absentee voter file we know (1) whether the individual returned their ballot, and 
(2) if they returned their ballot, whether it was challenged or counted.  We give the simple 
statistics for the entire absentee voter population in Table 4. 
Table 4 Goes Here 
In this particular election, almost one-quarter (23.93%) of the absentee ballots requested 
were not returned by voters.  72% of the absentee ballots were returned and included in the final 
tabulation of the vote.  An additional 4% of absentee ballots were returned, but challenged.  
When we recomputed the statistics of all returned absentee ballots, looking at the fraction that 
were counted or challenged, we find that 95% of returned ballots were not challenged.  However, 
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more than 20,000 ballots were challenged, and the way in which these ballots were adjudicated 
could have had a significant impact on many races. 
The next two tables provide descriptive information regarding whether individual ballots 
are returned and are counted, based on ballot request mechanisms and voter characteristics.  In 
Table 5, we give the ballot resolution statistics for the eight different types of absentee voters.  
This Table shows the percentages for each type of absentee voter who (1) did not return their 
ballot, (2) returned their ballot and their ballot was counted, and (3) returned their ballot but it 
was challenged and not included in the vote tabulation.  The categories of absentee voters who 
were less likely to return their ballot were those in vote-by-mail precincts (58%), overseas voters 
(47%), and permanent absentee voters (34%).  On the other hand, absentee votes coming from 
citizens who are hospitalized are very likely to return their ballots (only 2% did not return their 
ballot), as are those who requested an absentee ballot in person (9% did not return) or by using 
the sample ballot (14% did not return their ballot). 
Table 5 Goes Here 
Table 5 also shows the rates at which absentee ballots are challenged, if returned.  
Overseas voters are the most likely to have their absentee ballot challenged, with almost 10% of 
their ballots challenged and not counted.  Those in vote-by-mail precincts also have high 
challenge rates (8%).  At the other end of the distribution are walk-in and sample ballot absentee 
voters, with about 2% of each of their returned ballots challenged. 
In Table 6, we present ballot resolution rates for the variables we have for each citizen in 
the absentee voter file:  language, partisanship and age.  Again, we look first at ballot returns and 
then at whether the ballot is returned.  Beginning with ballot language, we see that non-English 
absentee voters are slightly more likely to not return their ballot, and marginally more likely to 
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have their ballot challenged if returned.  Amongst the partisan groupings used in Table 6, about 
one-third of third party or decline-to-state absentee voters did not return their absentee ballots, 
between 5 and 10 percentage points higher than for either Democrats or Republicans.   
Furthermore, third party and decline-to-state voters are marginally more likely to have their 
absentee ballots challenged and not included in the tabulation than are Democrats or 
Republicans.  When we look at absentee voting by age categories in the bottom panel of Table 6, 
we see that 25 to 35 and 36 to 50 year olds are more likely to not return their absentee ballots 
than very young (18-25 year old) or older (both 51-65 and older than 65) absentee voters.  On the 
other hand, we also see that 25-35 year old, and 36-50 year old absentee voters are marginally 
more likely to have their absentee vote challenged if they do return their ballot. 
Table 6 Goes Here 
Thus far we have only examined relatively simple bivariate statistical results.  We cannot 
say with much certainty whether some absentee voter types are more or less likely to return their 
absentee ballots (for example) than others without using a multivariate statistical analysis.  We 
now turn to a multivariate logit analysis to better examine our hypotheses.  We are interested in 
modeling the two-part process we have been calling ballot resolution:  (1) whether an individual 
returns their absentee ballot or not, and then (2) whether the returned ballot is challenged or 
counted.  Our approach here is to examine each component of this ballot resolution process 
independently.  That is, we first specify and estimate a logit model with a dependent variable of 
whether or not each voter returns the absentee ballot.  We then estimate the second logit model:  
conditional on ballot return, was the absentee ballot counted?11   
In our first logit model (ballot return) we code the dependent variable 1 if the absentee 
ballot was returned by the voter, and 0 otherwise.  In the second logit analysis, we code the 
 18
dependent variable 1 when the returned absentee ballot was challenged, 0 when the returned 
absentee ballot was not challenged.  We include indicator variables for the various types of 
absentee voters:  UOCAVA, Sample Ballot, In-person, Hospital, and Permanent absentee voters.  
We also include an indicator variable for whether or not the absentee voter requested an English 
language ballot, for partisanship (Democrat, Republican, and Decline-to-state), and for the 
voter’s age.   
Table 7 shows the logit analysis of absentee ballot return.  The Table is organized with 
each independent variable in a row, followed by the estimated model coefficient, the estimated 
standard error, and the estimated first difference.12  We concentrate our discussion on the 
estimated first differences in the last column of the Table.  For each type of absentee voter, we 
obtain statistically significant estimates, with the strongest effects estimated for Hospital, In-
person, and UOCAVA absentee voters.  For the first two types of absentee voters we see a 
relatively strong (0.28 and 0.20) and positive estimated effect:  if the absentee voter is either a 
Hospital or In-person voter, they are more likely to return their ballot than are the other types of 
absentee voters, holding all other variables in the model constant.  However, for UOCAVA 
voters the estimate is negative, which means that UOCAVA voters are 0.18 less likely to return 
their ballot, all other variables held constant, than the other types of absentee voters. 
Table 7 Goes Here 
Next, we find that absentee voters who request an English language ballot are 0.05 more 
likely to return their ballot, all other variables held constant.  Of course, this means that those 
requesting a non-English ballot are 0.05 less likely to return their absentee ballot.  Democrats 
and Republicans are also both statistically more likely to return their ballot than are third party 
voters (as the latter is the excluded or comparison category in this logit specification).  Decline-
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To-State voters are insignificantly different in their ballot return likelihood, relative to third-party 
absentee voters. 
Finally, Table 7 provides the first difference estimates for the various age groups, relative 
to absentee voters over the age of 65.  We find that, holding the other variables in the model 
constant, those in the 26 to 35 age category are the least likely to return their absentee ballots.  
Next in terms of likelihood of absentee ballot return are the 36 to 50 year olds, followed by the 
18 to 25 year olds.  Our results show that 51 to 65 year olds are only slightly (but statistically 
significantly) less likely that the 65 or older absentee voters to return their ballots. 
Table 8 contains the logit results for our second analysis:  whether the absentee ballot is 
challenged or counted, given that the voter returns it.  The results in Table 8 are presented in the 
same format as in the preceding table, and again we focus on the first difference estimates.13  
Here, we see that UOCAVA voters are by far the most likely to have their absentee ballots 
challenged (and not counted) if they are returned.  With the other variables in the model held 
constant, UOCAVA voters are 0.06 more likely to have their ballot challenged.  We estimate that 
Sample Ballot and In-person absentee voters are statistically less likely to have their ballots 
challenged, while Permanent absentee voters are slightly (but statistically significantly) more 
likely to have their ballots challenged if returned. 
Table 8 Goes Here 
Moving to the voter characteristics, we see that those using an English-language ballot 
are statistically less likely to have their ballot challenged if returned; again, this result implies 
that those using non-English language ballots are more likely to see their ballot challenged when 
returned.  The partisanship variables indicate that third-party voters are more likely to have their 
ballots challenged, holding the other factors in the model constant.  We find that Democrats, 
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Republicans, and Decline-To-State absentee voters are less likely to have their ballots challenged 
than third-party voters, but only by a very slight, yet significant, margin (each 0.01).   
Finally, for the estimates of ballot challenge for the various age groups, we see that 
absentee voters in the 26 to 35 age group are the most likely to have their absentee ballots 
challenged, twice as likely as those in the 36 to 50 age group.  18 to 25 year olds are slightly 
more likely than those older than 65 to have their absentee ballots challenged. 
Conclusions 
 
 Increasing numbers of Americans are turning to absentee voting, especially voting by 
mail.  Absentee voting is undoubtedly a more convenient way for many citizens to participate in 
the electoral process, and election administrators increasingly favor it because it reduces the 
number of citizens using traditional polling places to vote.   There have been a number of studies 
that have looked at the recent rise in absentee voting.  This literature has focused on the impact 
of voting by mail, either by looking at the effects that absentee voting has on voter turnout or the 
effects it has on the composition of the electorate.  Our study is different, as we have a unique 
dataset that allows us to study whether absentee votes were counted. 
 We see a series of important implications of our research.  The first step in the absentee 
voting process is the return of the ballot.  We found that overseas citizens, permanent absentees, 
and those citizens who requested a non-English ballot were substantially less likely to return 
their absentee ballot.  In particular, that overseas citizens and non-English speaking voters are 
less likely to return their ballots indicates that these two groups of absentee voters potentially 
face significant hurdles as they attempt to participate in the political process.  While we do not 
have information in our dataset that will allow us to better understand why these two groups of 
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voters are less likely to return their ballots, we speculate that the overseas voters are undoubtedly 
facing the sorts of difficulties highlighted in studies following the 2000 presidential election:  the 
significant amount of time that it can take for voting materials to be mailed and to be returned.  
Language minority voters, by contrast, may find casting their absentee ballot difficult because of 
lack of a understanding of the balloting process. 
 The second step, whether or not an absentee ballot gets counted once it is returned by the 
voter, also produced an intriguing result.  We found that overseas voters were substantially more 
likely to have their absentee ballot challenged and not counted than other types of absentee 
voters; our specific result indicated that an overseas citizen who returned their absentee ballot 
was six times more likely to have their ballot challenged and not counted relative to our 
comparison category of absentee voters who applied by mail.  Again, we do not have specific 
information about why overseas absentee ballots were more likely to be challenged, although we 
speculate that they are challenged because they are coming in after the official deadline in 
California – the close of polling on Election Day.  The GAO study (2001) found that, in counties 
that provided disqualified ballot data for military and overseas citizens, approximately 40% of 
the disqualified ballots arrived after the legal deadline for absentee voting.  It is also likely that 
overseas absentee ballots are being challenged due to other defects, like missing information on 
the return envelope.  Language minority voters may also be making errors on their absentee 
ballot return envelope that result in the ballot being challenged.  Unfortunately, the database we 
were provided does not provide any indication as to why ballots were challenged.14 
 Obviously, we must be cautious in generalizing our results in this paper as we are only 
studying one election in one California county.  It will be interesting to study other elections in 
Los Angeles County, as well as other states and counties, using the actual absentee voter files.  
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These databases provide a wealth of important information, especially concerning the 
administrative issues of who returns their absentee ballots and whose absentee ballots are 
counted.   
 The 2000 presidential election generated enormous interest in the basic questions of 
election administration in the United States.  Most of these studies, like the Caltech/MIT study 
that estimated that as many as 6 million votes were “lost” in that election, have studied polling 
place and voting system problems.  As increasing numbers of Americans participate using the 
absentee voting process, we clearly need to better understand how the absentee voting process 
works, who uses it, and what problems certain types of voters might encounter as they attempt to 
participate using the absentee voting process. 
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Notes 
 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the early changes in California’s absentee voting procedures 
and their impact see Patterson and Caldeira (1985). 
 
2 We say “as many as” because the Census estimate does not include overseas citizens or military 
personnel overseas.  In addition to universal absentee voting in Oregon, the use of absentee 
balloting was high in Washington (52%); Colorado, Nevada and Arizona (roughly 35%); and 
New Mexico and California (22%).  See U.S. Census Bureau (2002). 
 
3 Ballots that are not included in vote tabulation are sometimes called “disqualified” ballots 
(GAO 2001).  Excluded or disqualified ballots are not included in their entirety in vote 
tabulation; this is in contrast to “residual votes”, which are ballots on which no votes are counted 
for specific races because the voter did not make a discernable indication of preference 
(“undervotes”), or make more indications of preference than allowed (“overvotes”).  For studies 
of the latter “uncounted” votes, see Alvarez and Sinclair (2004), Ansolabehere (2002), and Tomz 
and Van Houweling (2003). 
 
4 See “A Guide To Absentee Voting in California, 2001”, California Secretary of State, Elections 
Division, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/Outreach/absentee/links/absgde_long.pdf for additional 
details about absentee voting in California. 
 
5 This is special class of absentee voters is covered in California Election Code Section 2166, 
which reads in part (Section 2166(a)):  “Any person filing with the county elections official a 
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new affidavit of registration or reregistration may have the information relating to his or her 
residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address appearing on the affidavit, or any list or 
roster or index prepared therefrom, declared confidential upon order of a superior court issued 
upon a showing of good cause that a life threatening circumstance exists to the voter or a 
member of the voter’s household …” (Section 2166(a)).  Such registered voters will “Be 
considered an absent voter for all subsequent elections or until the county election official is 
notified otherwise by the court or in writing by the voter” (Section 2166(b)(1)). 
 
6 In the 2002 general election there was another category of absentee voters:  those who voted in 
a special pre-election period, in person, using electronic touchscreen voting systems.  This was 
the result of a special pilot project in Los Angeles County; we consider these as early voters, and 
they are not included in our analysis below.  For research on early voting, see Stein and Garcia-
Monet (1997) and Stein (1998). 
 
7  See Hall (2002) for a detailed discussion of the ballot reconciliation and certification process 
used in Los Angeles. 
 
8 David Barstow and Don Van Natta, Jr., “How Bush Took Florida:  Mining the Overseas 
Absentee Vote”, New York Times, Sunday, July 15, 2001, page 1.  These data were also 
examined in an unpublished study by Kosuke Imai and Gary King, “Did Illegally Counted 
Absentee Ballots Decide the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election?”, January 2002, Harvard 
University, manuscript. 
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9 GAO 2001, page 54.  The GAO was unable to provide a national estimate for military and 
overseas absentee ballot disqualification rates for the larger counties due to unavailability of 
necessary information from such counties. 
 
10 Lien (1994) indirectly studied language use in the home for Asian- and Mexican-Americans 
and the impact it had on a variety of political participation measures, as in his analysis language 
use in the home was one of four measures that were collapsed into a single variable called 
“ethnic ties”.  In his analysis, he finds that “ethnic ties” do not impact voter turnout for either 
Asian- or Mexican-Americans; additionally, “ethnic ties” do not impact non-voting participatory 
activities for Asian-Americans, but stronger “ethnic ties” has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on non-voting participatory activities for Mexican-Americans.   
 
11 This process could also be modeled with a conditional logit model.  However, the sheer size of 
the absentee voter file we are using prevented use from easily estimating either a conditional 
logit model or a generalized-extreme value logit model.  An alternative estimation strategy we 
attempted was to select random subsamples of the absentee voter file and then to estimate 
conditional logit or general-extreme value logit models on the subsamples (with the intention of 
then averaging across multiple estimations on multiple subsamples); the problem here was that 
some of the absentee voter types, like UOCAVA voters, that are of great interest to use occur 
with so little frequency in the full absentee voter file that they are poorly represented in small 
subsamples of the dataset.   
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12 The first differences were estimated using the Clarify package in STATA (Tomz et al. 2003; 
King et al. 2000).  We estimated the first differences by first computing a baseline where all the 
independent variables were set to their minimum value (here 0).  Then we re-estimated the 
probability that the absentee ballot would be returned (or challenged if returned) after changing 
the value of the respective independent variable to the maximum value (here 1).  We report the 
difference between the two probability estimates; starred entries are those where the estimated 
95% confidence interval does not include zero. 
 
13 The first difference estimates are based on the same combination of values of our independent 
variables discussed above in note 12.   
 
14 The absentee voting file from the 2002 November election does have a field that indicates the 
date of ballot return.  90.5% of the challenged UOCAVA absentee ballots arrived after the legal 
deadline for absentee voting.  However, there are some apparent inaccuracies with data entered 
into this field, as it appears that there are 1114 absentee ballots with return dates after the close 
of election that were returned and not challenged.  Discussions with Los Angeles County 
Registar-Recorder staff indicated that this discrepancy arises from inaccuracies in data entry.   
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Table 1:  Types of Absentee Voters 
 
Sample Ballot 40.26 
Permanent 32.98 
Apply by Mail 22.46 
Vote by Mail 3.59 
Walk-in 0.29 
Overseas 0.28 
Hospital  0.14 
Other 0.00 
TOTAL 100.00 
N  473,831 
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Table 2:  Some Characteristics of Absentee Voters 
 
 Absentee Voters 
Language  
   English 96.67 
   Non-English 3.33 
Party Registration  
   Democratic 53.90 
   Republican 33.56 
   Third Party 2.42 
   DTS 10.12 
Age  
   18-25 19.27 
   25-35 8.06 
   35-50 22.14 
   50-65 24.68 
   >65 25.25 
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Table 3:  Characteristics of Different Absentee Voter Types 
 
Language Partisanship  
Non-
English 
Democratic Republican DTS Third 
Party 
Sample Ballot 40.67 33.60 48.22 47.10 49.56 
Permanent 34.71 33.62 32.43 32.14 29.76 
Apply by Mail 20.59 28.61 15.81 13.95 13.13 
Vote by Mail 3.38 3.46 2.91 5.87 6.57 
Walk-in 0.57 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.35 
Overseas 0.03 0.24 0.23 0.58 0.44 
Hospital 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.20 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 15,788 255,417 158,999 47,949 11,466 
      
 Age 
 18-25 25-35 35-50 50-65 >65 
Sample Ballot 39.52 40.23 43.65 43.75 34.32 
Permanent 35.86 20.71 24.09 29.58 45.94 
Apply by Mail 20.78 30.52 26.70 22.80 16.86 
Vote by Mail 3.07 7.46 4.82 3.24 1.93 
Walk-in 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.22 
Overseas 0.36 0.68 0.33 0.19 0.48 
Hospital 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.25 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 91,290 41,044 104,920 116,931 120,086 
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Table 4:  Absentee Ballot Resolution 
 
Not Returned 23.93 
Returned and Not Challenged 72.31 
Returned and Challenged 3.77 
N 473,831 
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Table 5:  Absentee Voter Types and Ballot Resolution 
 
 Not Returned Returned 
  Not 
Challenged Challenged N 
Sample Ballot 13.76 83.67 2.57 190,757 
Permanent 33.83 61.47 4.69 156,268 
Apply by Mail 22.12 74.12 3.76 106,410 
Vote by Mail 58.35 33.27 8.38 17,032 
Walk-in 9.05 88.61 2.34 1,370 
Overseas 47.38 42.98 9.64 1,317 
Hospital 2.25 93.56 4.19 668 
Other 22.22 77.78 0.00 9 
N 113,365 342,608 17,858 473,831 
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Table 6:  Absentee Voter Characteristics and Ballot Resolution 
 
Not Returned Returned  
 Not Challenged Challenged N 
Language     
   English 23.82 72.43 3.76 458,043 
   Non-English 27.10 68.76 4.14 15,788 
Party 
Registration 
    
   Democratic 24.66 71.50 3.84 255,417 
   Republican 20.24 76.25 3.51 158,999 
   Third Party 29.79 65.63 4.58 11,466 
   DTS 30.83 65.11 4.06 47,949 
Age     
   18-25 23.02 73.29 3.69 91,290 
   25-35 36.10 59.28 4.61 41,044 
   35-50 27.51 68.47 4.02 104,920 
   50-65 20.42 76.11 3.47 116,931 
   >65 20.72 75.68 3.61 119,646 
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Table 7:  Ballot Return: Logit Analysis 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error First Difference 
UOCAVA -.78 .06 -.18* 
Sample Ballot .81 .01 .14* 
In-person 1.31 .09 .20* 
Hospital 2.67 .26 .28* 
Permanent -.45 .01 -.10* 
English Ballot .23 .02 .05* 
Democrat .32 .02 .06* 
Republican .46 .02 .09* 
Decline-to-state -.03 .02 -.005 
18-25 -.25 .01 -.06* 
25-35 -.95 .01 -.23* 
35-50 -.55 .01 -.13* 
50-65 -.12 .01 -.03* 
Constant .81 .03  
Note: Dependent variable is coded 1 if the absentee ballot was returned by the voter, 0 
otherwise.  All variables but Decline-to-state had coefficients significantly significant at 
the p<.05 level. The baseline probability, with all variables set to 0, of ballot return was 
0.69 (standard error .006); the first differences reported here reflect the change from this 
baseline probability estimated from changing the respective variable to 1, and holding all 
others constant at 0. First differences that are significant at the p<.05 level are indicated 
by *. 
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Table 8:  Ballot Challenge: Logit Analysis 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error First Difference 
UOCAVA .80 .09 .06* 
Sample Ballot -.55 .02 -.02* 
In-person -.65 .18 -.03* 
Hospital -.01 .19 -.00 
Permanent .10 .02 .01* 
English Ballot -.13 .04 -.01* 
Democrat -.24 .05 -.01* 
Republican .25 .05 -.01* 
Decline-to-state -.14 .05 -.01* 
18-25 .07 .02 .004* 
25-35 .30 .03 .02* 
35-50 .18 .02 .01* 
50-65 .02 .02 .00 
Constant -2.84 .06  
Note: Dependent variable is coded 1 if the absentee ballot was challenges when returned 
by the voter, 0 otherwise.  All variables but Hospital and 50-65 had coefficients 
significant at the p<.05 level. The baseline probability, with all variables set to 0, of 
ballot challenge was 0.06 (standard error .003); the first differences reported here reflect 
the change from this baseline probability estimated from changing the respective variable 
to 1, and holding all others constant at 0. First differences that are significant at the p<.05 
level are indicated by *. 
 
 
